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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DON W E I L E R B E N N I O N , Executor 
of the Estate of Heber Bennion, Jr., 
V E R A W. B E N N I O N , and BEN-
N I O N R A N C H I N G COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs-ll espondents, 
vs. 
D U D L E Y M. AMOSS and D I A N A 
M.AMOSS, his wife, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
D A G G E T T COUNTY D E V E L O P -
M E N T CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 





N A T U R E O F PROCEEDINGS 
This was an action to foreclose a mortgage on real 
property in Daggett County. Following Sheriff's sale, 
the mortgagors moved the court for an order vacating 
1 
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the foreclosure sale. The assignee of the equity of 
redemption moved to intervene and join in the motion 
to vacate the sale. 
D I S P O S I T I O N O F CASE 
The trial court denied the motions. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Appellant seek reversal and remand to the District 
Court with directions to permit Daggett County De-
velopment Corporation to intervene as a defendant, 
to vacate the foreclosure sale, to enter judgment for 
appellants for all amounts paid in excess of that required 
to satisfy the mortgage indebtedness, and to satisfy 
the judgment previously entered in favor of the Ben-
nions and against the Amosses. 
S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS 
After a hearing at which both the Amosses and 
the Bennions were present and represented, the court 
on November 20, 1972, entered an Amended Decree 
of Foreclosure in which it directed the sale of the mort-
gaged property. The Amosses were not served a copy 
of the amnded decree or notified of its having been 
entered, and they were not able to obtain a copy until 
November 28, 1972 (Tr. 3). The sale was scheduled 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for December 15, 1972, and on December 13, the 
Amosses moved the court for an order postponing the 
sale, directing that the property be sold in parcels, 
and apportioning water stock among the various parcels. 
The motion was based on the ground that because 
of the delay in the Amosses' receiving a copy of the 
amended Decree of Foreclosure there was an unreason-
ably short time within which to interest potential 
bidders in attending the sale; that the statute required 
sale of the property in parcels and equitable apportion-
ment of the water stock. The motion for postponement 
was also based upon the ground that the Amosses had 
obtained a financing commitment and would be able 
to pay the mortgage indebtedness by December 27, 
1972, within two weeks after the scheduled foreclosure 
sale. 
In order to prevent the postponement from injur-
ing the Bennions, the Amosses stipulated that the sale 
could be conducted on December 27, 1972, without 
further notice or advertising, that the period of redemp-
tion might be reduced by the length of time equivalent 
to the extension granted, and that the defendants would 
pay interest at the rate of eight and one half (8%%) 
percent on the judgment for the period of the exten-
sion, though the judgment itself provided for interest 
only at the rate of five (5%) percent. After the court 
denied the Amosses5 motion, they contacted the Ben-
nions' counsel prior to the sale, showed him a copy of 
the loan commitment, and assured him that the money 
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to pay the debt would be available within a few days, 
but he refused to consent to any postponement of the 
sale. 
The sale was held on December 15, 1972. Mr. 
Amoss attended the sale and requested the sheriff to 
sell the property in parcels but the request was denied 
and the sheriff announced that the property would be 
sold in one piece (Tr. 22) ; when the bidding com-
menced the Bennions bid an amount sufficient to pay 
the mortgage indebtedness and costs of sale, whereupon 
Mr. Amoss, in behalf of Daggett County Development 
Corporation, offered a bid of $130,000. The Bennions' 
counsel said, "Is that cash? The sheriff will not accept 
anything but cash," and the sheriff refused to sell for 
anything but the payment of the full purchase price 
in cash at the time of the sale, though he stated that 
he was doing this on his own and not because of the 
instructions given to him by the Bennions' counsel. 
The amount for which the property was sold was 
$128,550, while the property was worth approximately 
$1,000,000. The property was subsequently redeemed 
by Daggett County Development Corporation ("DC-
DC"), assignee of the equity of redemption; but in 
order to redeem the property it was required to pay 
the Bennions $7,655.87 in excess of the mortgage debt, 
costs and interest. 
Following the sale the Amosses moved the court 
for an order vacating the foreclosure sale. At the hear-
ing on this motion the Bennions vigorously contested 
4 
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the Amosses' standing to obtain any relief inasmuch 
as the equity of redemption had been assigned to Dag-
gett County Development Corporation. The corporation 
thereupon filed a motion for leave to intervene as a 
defendant in order to file a motion in its own behalf 
to vacate the foreclosure sale. 
The court ruled that while some of the irregu-
larities in the sale might have prejudiced the defendants, 
the irregularities were waived by the redemption, and 
the record did not disclose "sufficient ultimate facts" 
to require vacation of the sale. The motion In vacate 
and the motion to intervene were denied. 
/"!'i I - XxUMENT 
I 
T H E T R I A L COURT A B U S E D I T S D I S C R E -
TION 1X R E F U S I N G TO v \ r \ T E T H E 
F O R E C L O S I m E <* \ T , E . 
Judicial mortgage and execution sales are intended 
for the sole purpose of seeing that the underlying debt 
is paid, and the sales must be conducted with fairness 
and due regard to the rights of the judgment debtors. 
The courts have not hesitated to vacate those fore-
closure sales in which statutory procedures have not 
been followed, in which the bidding has been chilled, 
in which the sale has been for a grossly inadequate price, 
or in which there have been other circumstances indi-
cating harsh or unfair dealing with the property. 
5 
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The present case does not involve a single ground 
for vacation of the Sheriff's sale, but an accumulation 
of grounds, any one of which has been held to be suffi-
cient to vacate such a sale: there was a refusal on the 
part of the sheriff to sell the property in parcels; there 
was chilled bidding; the sale was for a grossly inade-
quate price; and the sheriff placed unreasonable restric-
tions on the bidding by requiring DCDC, as bidder, to 
pay the entire purchase price in cash at the moment 
of sale. 
Sale in Parcels 
Mortgage foreclosure sales are governed by the 
provisions of Title 78, Chapter 37, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, and by Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. With respect to mortgage foreclosures it is 
provided in 78-37-1 UCA 1953: 
" * * * Judgment shall be given adjudging the 
amount due, with costs and disbursements, and 
the sale of the mortgaged property or some part 
thereof, to satisfy said amount and accruing costs, 
and directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the 
same according to the provisions of law relating 
to sales on execution, and a special execution or 
order of sale shall be issued for that purpose." 
Rule 69 (e) (3), URCP, provides in part: 
"Conduct of sale. All sales of property under 
execution must be made at auction to the highest 
bidder, between the hours of 9:00 o'clock, a.m. 
and 5:00 o'clock, P.M. After sufficient property 
has been sold to satisfy the execution no more 
shall be sold. * * * when the sale is of real prop-
6 
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erty, consisting of several known lots or parcels, 
they must be sold separately * * * . The judg-
ment debtor, if present at the sale, may also 
direct the order in which the property, real or 
personal, shall be sold, when such property con-
sists of several known lots or parcels, or of articles 
which can be sold to advantage separately, and 
the officer must follow such directions." 
The Utah Statute, 78-37-6 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, also directs that where shares of corporate stock 
evidencing title to a water right used, or intended to 
be used, or suitable for use, on the land is included in 
the sale, the water stock is to be equitably apportioned 
to the land, or some part thereof, in one or more parcels, 
as may be suitable. 
In Cole v. Canton Mining Company, 59 Utah 140, 
202 P . 830 (1921), this court held that a mortgagor 
had the right to demand sale by separate parcels. The 
question was treated but not decided in 1951 in Com-
mercial Bank of Utah v. Madsen, 120 Utah 519, 236 
P.2d 434 (1951). 
In Long v. Manning, 455 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. 
1970), the Supreme Court of Missouri dealt with the 
question of parceling property and concluded: 
"There cannot be the slightest doubt that a 
mortgage of real estate in this state is not con-
veyance of the legal title to the property. The 
mortgagor remains the owner of the property, 
and the mortgage only constitutes a lien thereon 
for the satisfaction of the mortgage debt. I t 
logically follows, without the slightest impair-
ment of the mortgage contract, that he is not 
7 
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entitled to a sale and probable sacrifice of the 
whole mortgaged premises if the mortgage debt 
can be satisfied in full by a sale of a part thereof. 
All that he can justly require is that his debt 
be paid out of the mortgaged property or as much 
as may be necessary to fully satisfy his secured 
obligation." 
In some jurisdictions sale of the property as a 
whole is void if sale by parcels would be appropriate, 
though the general rule is that such a sale is voidable 
at the instance of the mortgagor. 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, 
§575. 
That foreclosure sales may be set aside for failure 
to ahdere to the procedural rules is supported by First 
National Bank of Salt Lake City v. Haymond, 89 Utah 
151,57 P.2d 1401 (1936), Cole v. Canton Mining Com-
pany, supra, and Commercial Bank of Utah v. Madsen, 
supra. The effect of an improper execution of a rightful 
foreclosure is discussed at 108 A.L.R. 594. 
Inadequate Price 
Inadequacy of price is an additional ground for 
setting aside of foreclosure sale, particularly where 
accompanied by other circumstances. In Cole v. Canton 
Mining Company, 59 Utah 140, 202 p. 830 (1921), the 
court held that there is a duty to acquire the highest 
price possible for the property sold, although price 
cannot be the determining factor in all cases. In First 
National Bank of Salt Lake City v. Haymond, 89 U. 
151, 57 P.2d 1401 (1936), the court stated that "sub-
stantial inadequacy of price, coupled with fraud, mis-
8 
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take or other unfair dealing is sufficient to justify a 
court of equity upon timely motion to set aside the sale 
and order a resale." 
The authority of courts to set aside foreclosure 
sales for inadequacy of price, where coupled with other 
circumstances, is well established. The cases that follow 
are typical. 
In Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U.S. 285, 51 L.Ed 
803, 27 S.Ct. 527 (1907), the United States Supreme 
Court recognized the authority of trial courts to set 
aside foreclosure sales where gross inadequacy of price 
was coupled with other circumstances indicative of 
fraud, irregularity, or unfairness. 
Where land worth twenty-five times the debt wras 
purchased for the amount of the indebtedness, the court 
in Van Senden v. OyBrian, 58 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir., 
1932), said: 
" . . . The inadequacy of the sale price was so 
gross as to shock the conscience. Where this is 
the case, the invariable practice has been, on 
proper showing, to set the sale aside." 
The reasoning behind the rule is well stated in 
Raleigh and C. R. Company v. Baltimore National 
Bank, 41 F.Supp. 599, 601 (E.D.S.C., 1941) : 
"A judicial sale regularly made in the manner 
prescribed by law upon due notice, and without 
fraud, unfairness, surprise or mistake, will not 
generally be set aside or refused confirmation 
on account of mere inadequacy of price, how-
ever great, unless the inadequacy is so gross as 
9 
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to shock the conscience and raise a presumption 
of fraud, unfairness or mistake. Whether the 
price bid is grossly inadequate and whether and 
upon what grounds confirmation should be re-
fused are matters within the judgment and dis-
cretion of tribunal ordering the sale, with the 
exercise of which an appellate tribunal will not 
interfere except in cases of abuse . . . If the 
inadequacy of price is so gross as to shock the 
conscience, a Court of Equity would doubtless 
seize upon other circumstances impeaching the 
fairness of the transaction as a cause for vacating 
it. (Citation omitted). But the circumstances im-
peaching the fairness of the transaction should 
relate to the conduct of the officer making the 
sale, or to the conduct of the purchaser partici-
pating, in the attempt to stifle competition, chill 
the bidding or to take any other undue or unfair 
advantage." 
An inference at fraud in cases of gross inadequacy 
of price was suggested by the court in Ellis v. Powell, 
Mo. Sup., 117 S.W. 2d 225 (1938) : 
"Inadequacy of consideration, if it be so gross 
a nature as to amount in itself to conclusive and 
decisive evidence of fraud, is a ground for can-
celling a transaction. In such cases the relief is 
granted, not on the ground of inadequacy of 
consideration, but on the ground of fraud as evi-
denced thereby." 
; Where $11,000.00 worth of real estate was sold 
at a foreclosure sale for $402.00 plus $24.12 costs, the 
consideration was considered grossly inadequate, and 
such fact, when considered with some irregularities in 
the sale procedure warranted setting aside a sheriff's 
10 
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sale. Gaskill v. Neal, 77 Idaho 428, 293 P.2d 957 
(1956). The Gaskll court concluded that: 
"As a general rule, mere inadequacy of con-
sideration is not sufficient ground for setting 
aside a sheriff sale, but it is uniformly held 
that gross inadequacy of consideration, coupled 
with very slight additional circumstances, is suf-
ficient." (Emphasis added.) 
Justification for setting aside a foreclosure sale 
is also found in unconscionable circumstances such as 
mistake, fraud, collusion ,lack of good faith, unfairness 
or inequitable results. The duty of a court of equity 
to see that equity shall be done to all parties in a 
mortgage foreclosure proceeding was set forth in First 
National Bank of Salt Lake City v. Haymond, 89 U. 
151, 57 P.2d 1401 (1936). The Utah Supreme Court 
in that case recognized the elements of fraud, mistake 
and unfair dealing as considerations to justify the 
setting aside of a sale by a court of equity. 
In Bank of American National Trust and Savings 
Association v. Reidy et al, 15 Cal.2d 243, 101 P.2d 77, 
80 (1940), the court said: 
"I t is the general rule that courts have power to 
vacate foreclosure sale where there has been 
fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure de-
cree or where the sale has been improperly, 
unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted 
by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake 
that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to 
purchaser and parties. Sham bidding and the 
restriction of competition are condemned, and 
inadequacy of price when coupled with other 
11 
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circumstances of fraud may also constitute 
grounds for setting aside the sale." 
The element of "chilled bidding" was dealt with 
by the United States Supreme Court in Geifert v. 
National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221, 232, 61 S.Ct. 898, 
L.Ed. 1299 (1941): 
"And it is quite uniformally the rule in this 
country . . . that while equity will not set aside 
for mere inadequacy of price, it will do so if 
the inadequacy is so great as to shock the con-
science or if there are additional circumstances 
against its fairness, such as chilled bidding." 
As there is obviously an opportunity for oppression 
in enforcement of a power of sale, courts scrutinize 
its exercise in order to protect the mortgagor. Mills v. 
Mutual Building and Loan Association, 216 N.C. 664, 
6 S.E. 2d 549, 551 (1940). The judicial scrutiny is 
accompanied by power to set aside unconscionable sales. 
Handy v. Rodgers, 143 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 819 (1960). 
Payment in Cash 
The sale was held on a Friday. Mr. Amoss attended, 
bid $130,000.00 for the property in behalf of DCDC, 
tendered a check for $13,000.00 (ten percent of the 
bid price) as a deposit, and offered to pay the balance 
by the following Monday or Tuesday, but the sheriff 
demanded immediate payment of the entire $130,000.00 
in cash. 
There is limited case law on this problem, but what 
there is supports Mr. Amoss's position that the sale was 
improperly conducted. There was no warning of any 
12 
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strict cash terms in the Decree of Foreclosure, the Notice 
of Sale, or the Amended Summary Judgment; and 
there are no statutes or judicial rules requiring the 
entire purchase price to be paid in cash at the time of 
the sale. Indeed, Rule 69(e) (4), URCP, seems to con-
template some delay in payment of the purchase price. 
"In the absence of a statute or a provision in 
the mortgage to the contrary, whether or not 
the sale shall be for cash has been held to be 
within the discretion of the court, and such dis-
cretionary power to sell partly on credit should 
be exercised where the facts warrant such action 
in view of the interests of all parties." 59 C.J.S., 
Mortgages, §732. 
This reasoning has been followed consistently in 
case law. In Prudential Insurance Company of America 
v. Lemmons, 155 S.E. 591 (S.C., 1930), the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina said: 
"It is likewise beyond question that, in the ab-
sence of some statutory requirement, or some 
provision of the mortgage contract to the con-
trary, the discretionary power of a court of equity 
to order the sale of mortgaged premises for part 
cash and part on time, the credit portion to be 
secured by the note or bond and mortgage of 
the purchaser, was recognized and has been uni-
formly sanctioned in this state from an early 
period . . . and such seems to be the generally 
recognized practice." 
Citing the Lemmons case, the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina held in Federal Bank of Columbia v. 
Wells, 172 S.C. 1, 172 S.E. 707 (1934), that the court 
had abused its discretion in requiring cash at the fore-
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
closure sale. In doing so, the court pointed out that 
each case would be governed by its own peculiar facts, 
then proceeded to cite the "distressful times" and the 
fact that the mortgagee was selling property on easy 
terms. 
In essence, then, the court held that the court 
below had abused its discretion in disregarding the 
imposition upon the defendants and the hardship to 
them under existing conditions. 
In Whitfield v. Riddle, 78 Ala. 99 (1884), the 
Supreme Court upheld a credit sale upon foreclosure, 
despite a provision in the mortgage requiring a cash 
sale. The court said: 
"I t is further urged for appellants, that the 
arrangement by which Winston Jones permitted 
Tate and Morgan and purchase the Mitchell 
lands on credit, was a fraud which should avoid 
the foreclosure of the mortgage. Credit sales 
usually command higher prices than those made 
for cash. This would operate a benefit to the 
mortgagor, and to all others interested in his 
estate. There was nothing in the agreement cal-
culated to forestall rival bidding, and it is not 
shown the propery was sold below its market 
value. There is nothing in this objection." 
In the case of Horsey v. Hough, 38 Md. 130 (1873), 
the mortgagee bid $1,600 at the foreclosure sale, while 
another purchaser bid $2,375. The latter tendered 
$1,200 in cash and stated that the balance would be 
paid upon notification of the sale. The mortgagee de-
clined to accept the money as not in conformity with 
14 
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the terms of the sale, the property having been adver-
tised for sale, for cash. On appeal, the would-be pur-
chaser excepted to the sale as unfair and fraudulent. 
Upholding the position of the purchaser, the court 
held: 
"In determining upon the approval or rejec-
tion of the sale in such cases, the true question 
to be considered, is not so much whether there 
has been a literal or technical, as a fair and rea-
sonable compliance with the terms of sale; and 
a bona fide dispositon of the property. 
"Without intending to charge the mortgagee, 
in this case with the willful violation of his trust; 
the circumstances disclosed by the proof, show 
reasonable ground for the inference, that he 
misapprehended the nature of his duty, as trustee, 
which required an advantageous sale of the 
property, for the benefit of all the parties in-
terested." 
In 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, Section 576, it is said: 
« * * * where there is a manifest injustice in 
refusing part credit, even though the terms of 
the sale required cash, a subsequent sale for less 
than could otherwise have been realized will not 
be upheld." 
In view of the sum of money involved, and the fact 
that financing had already been arranged for, with 
closing set a few days after the sale, the instant case 
likewise involves elements of hardship to the defend-
ants of the type which led the Wells court to find an 
abuse of discretion. 
15 
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Even where the mortgage provided for a "cash 
sale," this was held not to require one hundred percent 
of the cash to be paid the day of the sale. This issue 
is examined at length in the Missouri decision of Long 
v. Manning, 455 S.W. 2d 496 (Mo., 1970). The 
court there dealt with a situation in which the full con-
sideration was not paid until six days after the fore-
closure sale. No authority was cited holding that the 
purchase price must be paid on the sale date. The court 
said: 
" * * * in Charles Green Real Estate Co. v. St. 
Louis Mutual House Building Co., 196 Mo. 358, 
93 S.W. 1111, it was held that payment made 
fifteen days after the sale (a deposit having been 
made at that time) was a substantial compliance 
with the requirement of a sale for cash. We find 
nothing to the contrary. We do find, however, 
the case of Snyder v. Chicago, S.F. & C.R. Co., 
131 Mo. 568, 33 S.W. 67, in which payment to 
the trustee was apparently not made by the pur-
chaser for approximately two months after the 
sale, after financing had been arranged and the 
sale (on behalf of a school fund) had been ap-
proved by the county court. The plaintiff there 
contended that the sale was not made for cash, 
but upon a secret arrangement for credit. The 
Court held that there was no abuse of authority 
by the sheriff as trustee, that plaintiff's mort-
gage had been satisfied, and that everything was 
fairly conducted. The contention that the sale 
was not made for cash within the meaning of the 
mortgage was denied. See also Webb et ux v. 
Salisbury, 327 Mo. 1123, 39 S.W. 2d 1045." 
The Long court concluded that the sale was a "cash" 
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sale even though all of the consideration was not ren-
dered on the sale date. 
In Strother v. Law, 54 111. 413 (1970), where the 
terms of the mortgage required a cash sale, the court 
held that a delay of a few days in closing the trans-
actions, by the making of the deed and payment of 
the money, will not be regarded as the giving of a credit 
to the purchaser. 
The bid by Amoss was in the sum of $130,000, 
thereby outbidding the plaintiffs by approximately 
$2,000. Nevertheless, Amoss' bid was rejected on the 
ground that he could not produce $130,000 on the spot. 
As recognized by the above cited cases, such a require-
ment is unrealistic and inconsistent with the practices of 
the financial world. 
I I 
A P P E L L A N T S ' S T A N D I N G TO CONTEST 
T H E F O R E C L O S U R E SALE IS NOT 
B A R R E D BY T H E F A C T T H E PROPERTY 
W A S R E D E E M E D . 
The defendants and their assigns were compelled 
to exercise their statutory right to redeem from the fore-
closure sale to avoid the risk of losing the property and 
to protect their investment which was placed in jeopardy 
by reason of the grossly inadequate purchase price at 
the foreclosure sale. The redemption price paid by the 
defendants and their assigns was therefore not a vol-
unteer payment, and payments made under compul-
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sion do not bar the right of appeal. In 39 A.L.R. 2d 
166, it is said: 
"IT]he courts agree that payment following the 
issuance of executon upon a judgment does not 
cut off the payor's right to appeal . . . Under 
this view the decisive factor is the coercive effect 
of the issuance of execution . . . " 
Burrows v. Stryker, 45 Iowa 700 (1877), held that 
payment of a money judgment to prevent a sale of 
property under execution is not voluntary and does 
not affect the payor's right to appeal or maintain an 
appeal from the judgment. 
Where a judgment debtor, after disregarding 
the sheriff's first notice requiring payment of the fieri 
facias, was informed that if payment was not made by 
a given hour, the sheriff would seize and sell defendants' 
stock in trade, and the defendants paid to avert such 
seizure and took immediate legal proceedings to stay 
the fund in the sheriff's hands, it was held in Johnson 
v. Clark, (1877) 29 La Ann 762, that the payment was 
compulsory and hence did not bar the defendants from 
maintaining a devolutive appeal. 
And, in Levin v. Sarojf, 54 Cal. App. 285, 201 Pac. 
961 (1921), the defendant to save his property from a 
forced sale under execution, and on the assurance of 
his attorney that he could recover his money in the event 
of a reversal, satisfied the money judgment against him. 
The Court of Appeals held that the payment was not 
voluntary so as to prevent an appeal by him. 
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In the present case, the payment was made to save 
title to valuable property. I t was compulsory and there-
fore does not bar the right to vacate the sale. 
I l l 
T H E COURT E R R E D I N R E F U S I N G TO 
G R A N T T H E MOTION O F D A G G E T T COUN-
TY D E V E L O P M E N T CORPORATION TO 
I N T E R V E N E . 
Intervention is governed by the provisions of Rule 
24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in 
part as follows: 
"(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely 
application anyone shall be permitted to inter-
vene in an action: (1) when a statute confers 
an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when 
the representation of the applicant's interest by 
existing parties is or may be inadequate and 
the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment 
in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so 
situated as to be adversely affected by distri-
bution or other disposition of property which is 
in the custody or subject to the control or dis-
position of the court or an officer thereof. 
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely 
application anyone may be permitted to inter-
vene in an action: (1) when a statute confers 
a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when 
an applicant's claim or defense in the main action 
have a question of law or fact in common. * * * 
in exercising its discretion the court shall con-
sider whether the intervention will unduly delav 
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or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of 
the original parties." 
The applicant does not contend that a statute gives 
it any right to intervene in this case, but does contend 
that it comes within the other two subsections of Rule 
24(a) for the following reasons: 
Although the present defendants have an interest 
similar to that of the applicant, their representation 
"is or may be inadequate'1 because of the fact that prior 
to filing of their motion to vacate the foreclosure sale 
they had assigned the equity of redemption to the 
applicant. Thus, while the desire of the defendants to 
adequately represent the applicant's position and their 
legal ability to do so is not questioned, the representa-
tion is not adequate if the mortgagors are barred because 
of their assignment of the equity of redemption. As 
successor in interest to the equity of redemption, the 
applicant had a right to come into court and protect 
its interest in the property and in the foreclosure pro-
ceedings. 
Additionally, the applicant is so situated as to be 
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition 
of property which is subject to the control or dispo-
sition of the court. The motion to vacate the foreclosure 
sale raises a practical issue of whether the defendants 
and the applicant, or either of them, are entitled to the 
return of approximately $7,600.00 representing the 
"penalty" charged for redemption from foreclosure 
sale. 
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Inasmuch as the applicant's situation is within the 
provisions of Rule 24(a), the only remaining question 
is whether the application is "timely," and that depends 
upon the posture of the case at the time the motion is 
made. As stated in 3B Moore's Federal Practice, (2d 
Ed.) Paragraph 24.13: 
"Subdivisions (a) and (b) both require that 
the application to intervene be 'timely.' 'This 
question of timeliness cannot be split off and 
considered in vacuo - as one separate and apart 
from the question of the paragraph of Rule 24 
under which intervention is sought.' Since the 
basis for the permissive right to intervene is 
largely one of trial convenience a court might 
properly deny a motion to intervene unless made 
at a very early stage, before substantial litiga-
tion of the issues has commenced, since it is 
required by subdivision (b) to 'consider whether 
the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice 
the adjudication of the rights of the original 
parties.' On the other hand the basis for inter-
vention as of right is chiefly the fact that the 
court's processes are apt to injure or prejudice 
the applicant unless he is permitted to intervene. 
# # # * 
Whether an application for intervention is 
timely does not depend solely upon the amount of 
time that may have elapsed since the institution 
of the action, although of course that is a rele-
vant consideration. Intervention has been allowed 
several years after commencement of a suit, 
where the substantial litigation of the issues have 
not commenced when the motion to intervene 
was tiled. * * * 
Timeliness is a matter within the sound dis-
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cretion of the trial court, whether the interven-
tion is allowed, or denied, and the court's deci-
sion is subject to reversal where discretion has 
been abused. 
Timeliness of permissive intervention should 
be measured relative to the time when the appli-
cant served the motion to intervene, not when 
the motion is granted and intervenors are made 
parties. 
Intervention after judgment is unusual and 
not often granted. It may be allowed, however, 
where it is the only way to protect the inter-
venors rights; e.g., where the intervenor would 
be bound by the judgment and the party pur-
porting to represent him fails to appeal, or where 
the intervenor is a member of a class in whose 
behalf an action was originally filed, or where, 
after the initial judgment, substantial questions 
are left in the shaping of a decree. The trial 
court may not allow intervention after an appeal 
has been taken, except in aid of the appeal. In 
an unusual case the appellate court may itself 
allow intervention." 
I t is conceded that if the applicant had sought to 
intervene in this case in connection with any matters 
relating to the right to foreclose, or to the form and 
shape of the decree of foreclosure, the application would 
not be timely and should be denied. But here the appli-
cation to intervene relates only to post-decree relief 
that the law allows the trial court to grant, inasmuch 
as a motion made to the court which supervised the 
mortgage foreclosure sale is regarded as the usual way 
of attacking the validity of the sale. 
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With respect to that issue, there had been no 
judgment in this case, and permitting the intervention 
would not have required the retaking of testimony or 
evidence. The evidence was in and the intervenor was 
willing to stand on the evidence as made, since the 
exhibits presented to the court at the hearing on the 
motion to vacate the foreclosure sale establish the assign-
ment of an interest to the applicant. Thus the appli-
cation was timely under the provisions of Rule 24 and 
it would not have unduly delayed or prejudiced the 
adjudication of the rights of the original parties under 
Rule 24(b). 
The rule of permissive intervention is aimed at 
judicial economy. In the present case the applicant's 
motion and the motion filed by the defendant-mort-
gagors have questions of law and fact in common. In 
fact the questions of fact are identical, and the questions 
of law differ only with relation to the standing to vacate 
the foreclosure sale. By permitting the applicant to 
intervene in this action the court would have been able 
to resolve all of the issues between the parties in this 
one proceeding and avoided forcing the parties to bring 
a separate action based upon the wrongful foreclosure 
sale. 
CONCLUSION 
The court erred in refusing to grant defendant's 
motion to vacate the sale and the motion of Daggett 
County Development Corporation to intervene. 
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As a result of the court's refusal to vacate the fore-
closure sale which disposed of the property at a grossly 
inadequate price, it became essential to redeem to pro-
tect the defendants' investment. The defendants cannot, 
therefore, be held to have waived the right to challenge 
the sale in a case where they were compelled to redeem. 
The errors which occurred in the process of the 
sale are too substantial to be passed over lightly. There 
is nothing in the record to indicate that the property 
could not have been sold in parcels. The requirement 
by the sheriff that the defendants produce the full bid 
price on the day of the sale was wholly unreasonable. 
On these and other bases hereinabove set forth, 
the decision in the court below should be reversed. 
Bryce E. Roe 
ROE AND F O W L E R 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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